Cartel and Oligopoly Pricing of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources

This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures in markets for nonrenewable natural resources. Following Hotelling (1931) and numerous subsequent authors, we assume that the total reserves of the resource in the hands of each producer cannot be increased and are reduced by production. Demand and cost conditions, including the relevant rate of interest, are constant over time. In such a world, producers must rationally consider price or output paths over time, so that both models outlined above become non-zero sum differential games. In what follows, we examine solutions to the games implied by various assumptions

Industry Effects on Firm and Segment Profitability Forecasting

Academics and practitioners have long recognized the importance of a firm’s industry membership in explaining its financial performance. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, recent research shows that industry-specific profitability forecasting models are not better than economy-wide models. The objective of this paper is to further explore this result and to provide insights into when and why industry-specific profitability forecasting models are useful. We show that industry-specific forecasts are significantly more accurate in predicting profitability for single-segment firms and, to some extent, for business segments. For multiple-segment firms, the aggregation of segment-level data for external reporting of firm-level financials obliterates the industry effects of their segments

Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?

Benefit-cost analysis has a potentially important role to play in helping inform regulatory decision-making, although it should not be the sole basis for such decision-making. This paper offers eight principles on the appropriate use of benefit-cost analysis.Environment, Health and Safety, Regulatory Reform

Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles

Benefit-cost analysis can play a very important role in legislative and regulatory policy debates on improving the environment, health, and safety. It can help illustrate the tradeoffs that are inherent in public policymaking as well as make those tradeoffs more transparent. It can also help agencies set regulatory priorities. Benefit-cost analysis should be used to help decisionmakers reach a decision. Contrary to the views of some, benefit-cost analysis is neither necessary nor sufficient for designing sensible public policy. If properly done, it can be very helpful to agencies in the decisionmaking process. Decisionmakers should not be precluded from considering the economic benefits and costs of different policies in the development of regulations. Laws that prohibit costs or other factors from being considered in administrative decisionmaking are inimical to good public policy. Currently, several of the most important regulatory statutes have been interpreted to imply such prohibitions. Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major regulatory decisions, but agency heads should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost test. Instead, they should be required to consider available benefit-cost analyses and to justify the reasons for their decision in the event that the expected costs of a regulation far exceed the expected benefits. Agencies should be encouraged to use economic analysis to help set regulatory priorities. Economic analyses prepared in support of particularly important decisions should be subjected to peer review both inside and outside government. Benefits and costs of proposed major regulations should be quantified wherever possible. Best estimates should be presented along with a description of the uncertainties. Not all benefits or costs can be easily quantified, much less translated into dollar terms. Nevertheless, even qualitative descriptions of the pros and cons associated with a contemplated action can be helpful. Care should be taken to ensure that quantitative factors do not dominate important qualitative factors in decisionmaking. The Office of Management and Budget, or some other coordinating agency, should establish guidelines that agencies should follow in conducting benefit-cost analyses. Those guidelines should specify default values for the discount rate and certain types of benefits and costs, such as the value of a small reduction in mortality risk. In addition, agencies should present their results using a standard format, which summarizes the key results and highlights major uncertainties.

Firm-size distribution and price-cost margins in Dutch manufacturing

Industrial economists surmise a relation between the size distribution of firms and performance. Usually, attention is focused on the high end of the size distribution. The widely used 4-firm seller concentration, C4, ignores what happens at the low end of the size distribution. An investigation is presented of the extent to which the level and the growth of small business presence influence price-cost margins in Dutch manufacturing. A large data set of 66 industries for a 13-year period is used. This allows the investigation of both small business influences within a framework in which that of many other market structure variables is also studied. Evidence is shown that price-cost margins are influenced by large firm dominance, growth in small business presence, capital intensity, business cycle, international trade, and buyer concentration